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THE SOCIAL BASIS OF NAZISM 
By Eiji OHNO* 
I 
Passing through the 1918 Revolution, the collapse of the authoritative-
hierarchal social structure which was prescribed by Max Weber as "the social 
preference of the land ownership"ll led to Weimar Republic," but this Weimar 
Republic fell, as is well-known, into a critical condition through the impact of 
the World Economic Crisis of 1929 and soon invited the establishment of Nazi 
dictatorship. In the transition period from the destruction of Weimar Republic 
to the formation of Nazi dictatorship special attention has to be paid to the 
phenomenon that Nazi vote dramatically increased in the diet (Reichstag)-elec-
tion with the 1929 Crisis as a turning point. As given in Table 1", the Nazis 
* Professor of Economics, Kyoto University 
1) Max Weber, Agrarstatistische und sozialpolitische Bctrachtungen zur FideikommiBfrage 
in PreuBen (1904), in: Gesammelte Aufsatze zur Soziologie und Sozialpolitik, To.bingen 1924, 
S. 359 Anm. 
2) Hisashi Sekiguchi, German Revolution and Fascism, in: "KEIZAIGAKU RONSO" (The 
Journal of Economics), Vol. 34, No.2, 1968; Hajime Shinohara, Introduction to the History 
of German Revolution, Tokyo 1956; Eiji Ohno, German Capitalism, Tokyo 1965. 
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NSDAP Nationalsozialistische Deutsche Arbeiterpartei 
(National Socialist German Labour Party) 
DNVP Deutschnationale Volkspartei 
(German National Peoples Party) 
DVP Deutsche Volkspartei 
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DDP Deutsche Demokratische Partei 
(German Democratic Party) 
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(German State Party) 
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THE SOCIAL BASIS OF NAZISM 3 
achieved a tremendous increment from a small, right-wing and aggressive sect 
into a mass movement based on a broad social basis in only a few years. It 
has been made clear by analysis of a series of election statistics conducted at 
the end of 1920's through the beginning of 1930's-"graduator for force in class 
struggle"4)-that the behaviour of the middle class (Mittelstand) offers a key for 
understanding such a rise of Nazism." 
It had originally been pointed out that the social carriers and supporters of 
Nazi movement were the middle class people first of a1l6) but "meteoric rise"7) 
of the Nazis in the election of September, 1930, revealed so clear the basic changes 
of political situation of Weimar Republic that it became a matter of urgent neces-
sity to make a study of the social basis of the rise of Na.zism. One of those 
wbO pointed out the existence of the problem correctly and immediately after 
the election was Theodor Geiger. 
He disclosed that the victory of the Nazi was brought about through a land-
slide shift of the middle class, the wide strata occupying a weight of 1/3 or more 
of total population of Germany, to the side of the Nazis and at the same time 
urged a need to develop policies including appropriate measures toward the middle 
class and steps against unemploymentS" anticipating that such a trend means a 
4) Heinz Neumann, Die internationale Bedeutung der deutschen Reichstagswahl, Inter· 
nationale Pressekorrespondenz Nr. 69 vom 15. August 1930, in: Thea Pirker, Kamintern 
und Faschismus 1920-1940, Stuttgart 1965, S. 152. 
5) Of. Iring Fetscher, Zur Kritik des sowjetmarxistischen Faschismusbegriffs, in: Von 
Tl1eimar zu Hitler, herausgegeben von Gotthard Jasper, KOln. Berlin 1968, S. 157. One 
example of analysis of such election statistics is Werner Stephan, Grenzen des national· 
sozialistischen Vormarsches, in: Zeitschrift filr Politik, Ed. 21, Berlin 1932. Refer to 
Okio Murase, The Political Trend of Peasants in the Age of Weimar Republic (1919-1932), 
in: "KE/EI TO RQMU" (Management and Labor), ed. by Society in Commemoration of 
60. birthday of Prof. Noda, Tokyo 1955. 
6) Cf. H. Tittel, Die faschistische Gefahr in SOddeutschland, Internationale Pressekorres-
pondenz Nr. 243 vom 27. Dezember 1922, in: Th. Pirker, op. cit., S. 141 f. 
7) Karl Dietrich Bracher, Die Auflosung der Weimarer Republik, 2. Aufiage, Stuttgart. 
Dusseldorf 1957, S. 359. 
8) Cf. Theodor Geiger, Panik im Mittelstand, in: Die Arbeit, Zeitschrift Jilr GewerkschaJt-
politik und Wirtschaftskunde, Berlin 1930, Heft 10, S8. 637-654. According to estimation 
by Th. Geiger in the study the old middle class was composed of 4,900,000 peasants (with 
20 or less ha land), 3,070,000 artisans (with 10 or less journeymen), 2,300,000 merchants 
and 3,300,000 rentiers thus totaling 13,570,000 and the new middle class totals 9,932,000 
which is broken down into 7,000,000 :salaried empluyees, 2,300,000 civil servants, and 
532,000 professionals. Accordingly overall middle class marked 23,502,000 after the old 
middle class is added· to the new middle class, which composes 1/3 of the aggregate 
German population (ibid., S. 641 f.). After that Th. Geiger issued uDie soziale Schicht-
ung des deutschen Volkes, Stuttgart 1932" in which he tried to make a deeper statistical 
analysis on the construction of social strata in Germany under the reign of Weimar 
Republic, established the weight of the middle class (ibid., S. 73), pointed then out, 
"The problem of the so-called middle class is now closely related to the problem of 
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mere explanation of a transitional panic situation of the middle class. The pro-
gress of the history, however, was switched to another line in the direction of 
"The Third Reich" with no effective policies taken shape in connection with 
policies for the middle class and policies to deal with the crisis by the Republic 
Government. The Nazis, which had risen by laying hold of the middle class, 
seized political power being tied up with the German ruling class including the 
upper bourgeoisie and the ] unker cla.ss. 
The middle class, which had still put confidence in Weimar Republic im-
mediately after 1918 Revolution, faced an irrevocable ruin in the process of 
development of inflation policies and promotion of industrial rationalization 
movement and began trusting its aspiration to the Nazis which had advocated 
the so called "middle-class socialism" amid the "Great Depression" starting in 
1929 Crisis being estranged from the Weimar Republic which lacked economic 
policies to protect the middle class. The "middle-class socialism" was composed 
of three main pillars: "peasant socialism" (Bauernsozialismus), "artisan socia-
lism" (Handwerkersozialismus) and Nazi ruralism which aimed at establishment 
of a new type of "rurban community" as an intermediary ring connecting both 
the formers9), and above all the Nazi Left pushed it to the front for the purpose 
of representing interests of the middle class which became radica\.lO) 
National Socialism." (ibid., S. 109), and extracted a fact that the economic distress for 
both the new and the old middle class had created a psychological situation aspiring 
petty bourgeois radicalism and such a psychological tendency of the middle class had 
a close connection with Nazi ideology eeL ibid., SS. 109-122). Besides this work by Th. 
Geiger attention has to be placed on the following work, which reveals the social basis 
of Nazi dictatorship before its establishment, Hans Jager, Die Nationalsozialistische Ar-
beiterpartei, Internationale Pressekorrespondenz Nr. 46 vom 3. luni 1932, in: Th. Pirker, 
op. cit., SS. 158-167. 
9) Arthur Schweitzer, Big Business in the Third Reich, Bloomington 1964, pp. 113, 201. 
10) Cf. Reinhard Kuhnl, Die nationalsozialistische Linke, Meisenheim am Glan 1966. The 
Nazi Left exhibited a platform to create a new peasantry through a land reform aiming 
to divide large land ownership in relation to the agrarian and land problem and at the 
same time to maintain the peasantry in the Autarkie system protected by protective 
tarrif policy (ibid., SS. 79-85) and in respect to criticism of capitalistic system attention 
has to be paid on its stress put on solidarity of interests between the new middle class 
and the working class by hammering out policies against capitalism from viewpoint of 
the new and the old middle classes (ibid., SS. 67-70). However, even if the Nazi Left 
proposed expropriation of large land ownership or struggle against dictatorship of finance 
capital or ruling by capitalistic monopoly, it has to be kept in mind that "The left 
National Socialists represented essentially a socialism for petty bourgeoisie", as pointed 
out by R. Kuhn1 (ibid., S. 86), since they admitted in principle that private ownership 
of means of production has to be maintained (ibid., S. 64). One of those examples that 
prickes the reality of the pseudo-socialism of the Nazi Left led by Strasser Brothers is 
an address made by R. Hilferdings criticising G. Strasser at the diet (Reichstag) on 
May 11, 1932 (Nationalsozialismus und Marxismus, Rede (RudolfJ Hilferdings nach dem 
amt!. Reichstagsstenogramm, Berlin 1932.). 
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As against this trend the party leaders led by Adolf Hitler which tried to 
seize power by entering into an alliance with the social upper class as well as 
appealing to all different groups of the middle class did not hesitate to sacrifice 
the interests of the broad middle class, their supporters, for the sake of coalition 
with the upper classll). Accordingly, prior to the command of power by the 
Nazis the political lines of "middle-class socialism" stressed by the Nazis had 
been gradually depri\'ed of their original meaning in parallel with restraint of 
the Nazi Left including exclusion of Otto Strasser group in summer, 1930 and 
purge of Gregor Strasser at the end of 1932 and after the seizure of power be-
came in ruin with the Ernst Rohm purge of June 30, 1934 as the decisive 
turning point. After that, the public work policies, which took into account 
the interests of artisans, were moved backwards and the rearmament policies 
responding to interests of monopoly capitals came up to the surfacel2l • 
Anyway, it might be said that an analysis of the behaviour of the middle 
class plays an indispensable role as a preparatory work for understanding the 
transition period from Weimar Republic to Nazi dictatorship. Ernst-August 
Roloff said, "September 14, 1930, was recorded in history as one of the most 
significant and disastrous fatal days of Weimar Republic. "13) and established a 
question, "Who elected Hitler ?", as "a thesis for socio-economic history of 
Weimar Republic". It seems to be of contemporary significance above all to 
shed light on the social basis of Nazism by carrying out further study from such 
a point of viewW . 
II) Refer to R. Kuhnl, op. cit., SS. 89, 135. 
12) Cf. A. Schweitzer, op. cit., pp. 160~162. Incidentally, Gerhard Kroll pointed out too 
that in the initial stage of Nazi Regime policies were changed from pr~vision of work 
for unemployed (Arbeitsbeschaffung) to rearmamert (Wiederaufro.stung) policies (G. 
Kroll, Von der Weltwirtschaftkrise zur Staatskonjunktur, Berlin 1958, SS. 467, 470,473,477 
ff.), but Wolfram Fischer (Deutsche Wirtschaftspolitik 1918-1945, Opladen 1968, SS.62, 
95) and Dieter Petzina (Hauptprobleme der deutschen Wirtschaftspolitik 1932/33, in: 
Vierteljahrsheftex fur Zeitgeschichte, 15. Jarhrgang 1967 I. Heft, SS. 43, 55) took a nega-
tive stand as to whether economic policies in the initial stage of Nazi Regime should 
be classified into two, the period of work-providing and rearmament and claim that 
policies of rearmament governed from the beginning. For example D. Petzina clarifies 
his conclusion as follows: "Despite of such an importance of agrarian sector and in this 
connecition all the yields made toward agriculture, however, we have not disregard that 
economic policies had as a whole from the beginning a decive orientation to aim at re-
armament which takes shape only by big industry. Therefore the dogmas and wishes 
for the peasantry and the middle classes, however important at the beginning these 
might be from tactical consideration, played only a secondary role and its significance 
disappeared soon after the period here inspected (accordingly after 1934)". (D. Petzina, 
op. cit., S. 55). 
13) Fran,t-August Roloff, Wer Wahlte Hitler? in: i'oliti,ehe Studien, Zweimonatsschrift fur 
Zeitgeschichte und Politik, Munchen, 15. Jahrgang 1964 Heft 155, S. 293. 
14) To take an example, the fact that National Democratic Party of Germany (National-
demokratische Partei Deutschlands, NPD), regarded as a Neo Nazi party, gained the 
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II 
In analyzing percentages of votes obtained by parties in the diet (Reichstag)-
elections under Weimar Republic in accordance with Table I, one can recognize 
three transitional phases. In the first phase the parties of Weimar Coalition 
(SPD, Zentrum, DDP) maintained a ruling stand with total percentages of votes 
of 82.4 % in 1919 and 67.0 % in 1920. However, the percentages of votes obtained 
by all the parties in Weimar Coalition could not reach the majority after 1924 
when the revolutionary period from 1918 Revolution came to an end. The 
second phase in 1924 and after shows signs of reignforcement of conservatives. 
This is disclosed in the change of the votes obtained by DNVPI5l from the elec-
tion in May, 1924, to that in December, 1924. This phase, which corresponds 
to the so-called relatively stable period (1924-1928), changed into the third phase 
with the 1929 Crisis as a turning point. Amid the "Great Depression" when a 
riotous situation was again brought about as seen at the end of 192316), Germany 
entered the phase of Nazi advancement. As already pointed out, the Nazis be-
came ranked second in all the parties as a result of getting 6,400,000 votes or 
18.3 % in the election of September, 1930, and Weimar Republic stood faced with 
a decisive turning point. This Nazi advancement culminated in the election of 
July, 1932, when the World Economic Crisis reached the rock-bottom level and 
it is supposed that the formation of such a broad social basis of the Nazis was 
not only based on the considerable number of votes of former nonvoters and 
newly qualified persons for the Nazis but also the landslide shift of the electo-
most vote a,t an election of Bavaria in November, 1966 in the districts where played a 
role of stronghold of the Nazis in the past in Middle Franconia and other districts (Sad-
deutsche Zeitung, 21-22 November 1966, 22. Jahrgang Nummer 278-279) gives a hint as an 
indicator for understanding political current in West Germany. Now, if it is admitted 
the phenomenon of Fascism movement has arisen internationally at the stage of general 
crisis of capitalism, it would be necessary to conduct an analysis from comparative his-
torical viewpoint on its social basis. When comparison is made between social basis of 
German Fascism and Japanese Fascism, a work by Masao Maruyama, Thought and Move-
ments of Japanese Fascism, in: Thoughts and Behaviour of Comtemporary Politics, Tokyo, 
1964, pp. 29-B7 (ef. Thought and Bahaviou, in Modern japanese Politics, ed. by Ivan Marris 
with Author's Introduction to the English Edition, Oxford University Press, 1963) has 
to be referred to. The work by Seymour Martin Lipset, which tried to make a Com-
parative analysis on Poujadism of France, Socialist Movement of Italy (Movimento So-
ciale Italiano, MSI), McCarthyism of U.S.A., etc. in their social basis gives a suggestion 
since these movements have regarded as Neo Fascism in post War days. (Cr. S. M. 
Lipset, Der "Faschismus"-die linke, die Rechte und die Mitte, in: Kalner Zeitschrift 
fil, Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, KOln.Opladen, 11: Jahrgang 1959 Heft 3, SS. 401-444.). 
15) As for characteristics of DNVP refer to Seiji Kimura, German National Peoples Party 
in 1918.20, in "Shigaku.Zasshi" (Historical journal), Vol. 77, No.2, 196B, pp. 1-44. 
16) Cf. Arthur Rosenberg, Der Faschismus als Massenbewegung, in: O. Bauer-H. Marcuse 
·A. Rosenberg, u.a., Faschismus und Kapitalismus, Frankfurt am Main 1967, S. 132. 
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rate supporting fomerly bourgeois parties except the Center Party (Zentrum) 
and the swing of even some portion of the electorate supporting the left-wing 
parties to the Nazis. The supposition derives from Table I on one hand and is 
also clarified from an analysis of the diet (Reichstag)-e1ections centered on Lower 
Saxony made by G. Franz. He presents an assumption that the voters for the 
Nazis were roughly broken down as follows in the election of July, 1932 :!7) 
Voters for NSDAP in 1928 
Votes lost by DNVP after 1928 
Votes lost by DVP after 1928 
Votes lost by DDP after 1928 
Votes lost by Welfen after 1928 
Votes lost by other parties 

















Although it is of course not admitted to generalize the cases of Lower Saxony 
(its electoral districs divided into East Honover, South Hanover-Brunswick and 
Weser-Ems), the fact that the right-wing and middle-road parties lost 38.5 % of 
their votes (total votes lost by DNVP, DVP, DDP, Welfen), new voters and 
newly qualified persons obtained 36.7 % and other parties lost 16.0 % of votes 
(various left-wing parties are included) among the votes obtained by the Nazis 
in the election of July, 1932, justifies that it is not a mistake to attribute the 
factors inducing the new situation to the above-mentioned reasons.!S) 
Then, in reviewing the shift of the percentages of votes obtained by the 
Nazis in the electoral districts of the diet (Reichstag) on the basis of Table 219), 
attention has to be paid .first of all to the phenomenon that the Nazis won a 
considerably high percentages of votes in such districts as Mecklenburg, Fran-
conia, Upper Bavaria-Swabia, Lower Bavaria, Thuringia, Merseburg, etc. in 
17) Gunther Franz, Die politischen Wahlen in Niedersachsen 1867 his 1949, 3. crganzte 
Auflage mit einem Anhang: Die Wahlen 1951 bis 1956, Bremen=Horn 1957, S. 61. 
18) By making a comparison among votes obtained by parties in main districts of Ger· 
many in respect to the election of May, 1928, and September, 1930, Arthur Dix assumes 
that the working class of marxism did not change their support into the Nazis since the 
reduction of votes of the Social Democratic Party was easily off .. set by increase of votes 
obtained by the German Communist Party (Cf. A. Dix, Die deutschen Reichstagswahlen 
1871-1930 und die Wandlungen der Volksgliederung, Tobingen 1930, SS.47-49). If it is 
admitted that his estimate ean be made roughly, the fact has not to be dismissed that 
even some electorate of the left-wing parties shifted their support to the Nazis. A. Ro-
senberg estimates that big increase of Nazi votes from some 800,000 in May, 1928 election 
to some 17,300,000 in March, 1933 election was classified into some 7,000,000 votes from 
former right-wing electorate, some 8,500,000 votes from new voters and some 1,000,000 
votes from former left-wing electorate (A. Rosenburg, op. cit., S. 134). 
19) M. Hagmann, op. cit., S. 10 f. 
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TABLE 2 Percentages of Votes Obtained by the Nazis Classified by Electoral Districts of 
the Diet (Reichstag) (1924-1932) 
Ratio of Popula- . 1 
tion Classified ~at10 of Popul~-19241924 1932 1932 
Electoral District by Religion hon. Engaged In 19281930 Agtlculture and I II I I II 
Cath l"clpro- Forestry 
o 1 testant 
1 
! 
'I ' Schleswig~Holstein 4.0 88.2 22.2 ) 7.42.74.027.0151.0 45. 7 
East Hanover 4.9 91. 8 
, 
35.0 18.64.42.620.649.5 42.9 
I Frankfurt a. d. Oder 10.9 85.9 33.4 5.03.2 1.022.748.1 42.6 , 
Liegnitz 17.2 79.2 
I 
28.3 11.5 1.5 1.2 20.848.0 42.1 
Pomerania 3.9 92.4 38.1 7.3 4.211.5 24.347.9 43.1 
East Prussia 15.8 81. 5 I 42.2 18.6' 6.21 0.8 22.547.1 39.7 , 
23.8147.0 Chemnitz-Zwickau 3.3 89.4 i 5.9 , 7.7 4.2, 4.3 43.4 , 
South Hanover-Brunswick 12.0 81. 2 20.9 i 7.6 3.414.4 24.3146. 1 46.6 




81 1.92.0 20.144.8 37.0 
Magdeburg 6.8 87.1 22.1 4.9 3.0 1.7 19.5 43.8 39.0 
Pfalz 42.3 54.9 21. 1 1 5.7 1. 9 5.6 22.8 43.7 42.6 
Hessen-N assau 28.1 66.8 21. 4 I 5.6 2.5 3.6 20.8 43.6 41. 2 
Breslau 36.9 58.0 22. 7 4.0 1.4 1.0 24.2 43.5 40.4 
Thuringia 8.2 84.2 18.4 9.9 5.4 3. 7 19.3 43.4 37.1 
Hessen-Darmstadt 31. 0 64.1 
I 
21.5 i 2.9 1.3 1.9 18.5143. I 40.2 
, . 
Merseburg 5.1 89.9 , 20. I 18. 7 4.31 2. 7 20.542.6 34.5 
Franconia 48.4 49.6 i 29.6 20.7 7.5 8.1 20.539.9 36.4 
, 
i 4.511.5' 1.8 Dresden-Bautzen 6.1 85.3 I 10.8 16.139.3 34.0 
Weser-Ems 26.3 69.1 I 28. 7 I 7.4 4.8 5.2 20.538.4 31. 9 
, 
Potsdam I 8.2 82.8 21.1 I 5.8 2.8 1. 6 18.8 38.1 34.1 
, 
Baden 58.3 38.1 25.1 4.8 1.912.9 19.2 36.9 34.1 
Leipzig 4.1 83.4 8. I 7.9 1.8 1.9 14.0 36.1 31. 0 
Hamburg 5.9 79.3 2. I 6.0 2.3 2.6 19.2 33. 7 27.2 
Potsdam II II. I 71. 4 4.2 I 6.51 2.9 1.8 16.7 33.0 29.1 
DUsseldorf-East 43.5 46.2 2.5 ' 3.9 1.6 1.8 17.0 31. 6 27.0 
Wtlrttemberg 33.8 62.2 28.3 4.1 2. Ii 1.9 9.4 30.3 26.2 
Oppeln 89.1 9. 7 
, 
25.7 2.6 1.5 1.0 9.5 29.3 26.8 
1 Koblenz-Trier 75. 7 22.5 1 35.5 11.3 - 2. I 14.9 28.8 26.1 
Westphalia-South 42.7 50.2 7.4 
11.5 
l.l 1.6 13.9 27.2 24.8 
Upper Bavaria-Swabia 86.4 II. 0 28.9 17.0 4.8 6.2 16.3 27. I 24.6 
DUsseldorf-West 65.4 28.4 7.9 12.6 0.9 1.2 16.8 27.0 24.2 
Westphalia-N orth 52.0 44.3 18.9 3.5 1.3 1.0 12.0 25.7 22.3 
Berlin 11.1 70.2 1.2 3.6 1.6 1.4 12.8 24.6 22.5 
Lower Bavaria 94.7 4.8 47.3 10.2 3.0 3.5 12.0 20.4 18.4 
KOln-Aachen 80.9 14.3 
I 
11.5 11.5 0.6 I. I 14.5 20.2 17.4 , 
German Reich ] 32.7 ] 61.Z 21. 0 ]6.61 3.01 2.6]18. *7.2133. 1 
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the electiQn Qf May, 1924. In fQur electQral districts (Mecklenburg, FrancQnia, 
Thuringia, Merseburg) Qut Qf these six, German NatiQnal PeQples Party had 
fQrmerly held its PQsitiQn Qn the basis Qf electQrate in rural districts (with less 
than 2,000 PQPulatiQn) mainly cQmpQsed Qf protestants but such the strata are 
apparent to. have switched to. the Nazis since they became radical as a result 
Qf infiatiQn causing their straitened circumstances20). In case Qf Qther two. elec-
tQral districts (Upper Bavaria-Swabia, LQwer Bavaria) it is cQnceivable that the 
Nazis caught successfully hQld Qf the special PQlitical situatiQn Qf Bavaria since 
they springed from there and particularism Qr separatism mQvement was centered 
there. 
HQwever, after the infiatiQn was cQmbated and the German eCQnQmy marked 
a transitiQn to. the relatively stable periQd, lQcal rise Qf the Nazis cQllapsed and 
the general tendency Qf their decline was made clearer as given by the percen-
tages Qf VQtes in the electiQns Qf December, 1924, and May, 1928. 
The sQ-called "GQlden 1920's" crumbled because Qf break-Qut Qf the 1929 
Crisis and a decisive turning PQint was given then to. invite drastic rise Qf the 
Nazis. The Nazi advancement had clearly clQse relatiQnship with the WQrld 
ECQnQmic Crisis. If intensity Qf the crisis is assumed to. be measured by un-
emplQyment rate in case Qf urban districts and by debt rate in case Qf rural 
districts, it was fQund that percentages Qf VQtes Qbtained by the Nazis develQped 
a tendency to. interrelatiQn with the unemplQyment rate in urban districts and 
debt rate in rural districts22). HQwever, it is withQut saying that the Nazi 
advancement differed in accQrdance with difference Qf area so. that an analysis 
Qn sQcio.-ecQnQmic structure has to. be made in respective districts since it is 
insufficient to. relate the Nazi rise to. intensity Qf the crisis in elucidating such 
a lQcal difference. 
III 
Let us cQmpare the electQral district where the Nazis WQn the mQst percen-
tages Qf VQtes with that where they Qbtained the least Qnes in the electiQn Qf 
July, 1932, based Qn Table 2. RQughly speaking, the Nazis gQt the largest sup-
PQrt mainly in districts dispersing in NQrtheastern Germany and Middle Germany 
particularly Qf agricultural nature, while the districts in which the Nazis accepted 
the strQngest resistance were in WestsQuthern Germany and big cities specifically 
20) Werner Kaltefleiter, Wirtschaft .nd Politik in Deutschland, 2. Auflage, KOln und Op1a-
den 1968, SS. 31, 34. 
21) Ibid., S. 34. Incidentally see G. W. F. Hallgarten, Imperialism and Present, ed. by M. 
Nishikawa, Y. Tominaga and T. Kage, Tokyo 1967, p. 238. 
22) VgJ. W. Kaltefleiter, op. cit., SS. 40-44. 
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of industrial nature23). At the same time, it is true that the Nazis shifted the 
weight of their movement from South Germany to Northeastern Germany clearly 
in the process of their advancement to find out a main resonance board there. 
Firstly, a study will be made on Schleswig-Holstein district where the ad-
vancement of the Nazis was most remarkable. 
(I) Immediate advancement of the Nazis was seen in urban districts in 
Schleswig-Holstein but they spread to rural districts in the course of time and 
as a result the Nazi strongholds were not built in urban districts but in rural 
districts. Rural districts of Schleswig-Holstein are classified by R. Heberle into 
three major zones in respect to socio-economic structure, the coastal marshes 
(Marsch) in the west, the rolling sandy Geest (high and dry land) in the middle, 
and the Baltic hill (Hiigelland) zone in the east"'). In the hill zone, particularly 
in East Holstein of its eastsouthern part (both districts of Oldenburg and Pion) 
the ruling of large land ownership of Junkers continued in existence25), the socio-
economic structure of rural districts belonged to the type of the east of the Elbe. 
As against this the Marsch zone and the Geest zone belonged to the type of the 
west of the Elbe. In the Marsch zone commercial farming connected with dairy 
farming and stock farming and specialization of management has been deve-
loped, class differentiation of the peasantry was remarkable anli the big farmer 
class (50-100 ha), who had life style and consciousness regarded as "peasant 
aristocracy" (Bauernaristokratie), was widely formed. In this way, daily social 
intercourse and connubiality lacked between the farmer class and agricultural 
labourers, and discrimination consciousness existed between them from stand-
point of social standing and antagonistic class consciousness was also created'6). 
In comparison with the Marsch zone, formation of a big farmer class was limited 
in the Geest zone, where the peasantry is centered on middle farmers (10-20 ha) 
with emphasis of farming placed on stock farming including pig raising. The 
socio-economic structure in the Geest zone features gradual development of class 
differentiation of the peasantry, less status-distinctions between farmers and 
Gesinde (servants) and day labourers and maintenance of ties of community 
like "neighbourhood" (Nachbarschaft) than in the Marsch zone.'7l Attention 
23) Of. James K. Pollock, Foreign Government and Politics, an areal study of. the German-
electorate, 1930-1933, in: The American Political Science Review~ Vol. XXXVIII No.1, 
Wisconsin 1944, pp. 89-95. 
24) Cf. Rudolf Heberle, Landbevolkerung und Nationalsozialismus, Stuttgart 1963, SS. 48 If. 
It is quoted as Landbevolkerung. Of. R. Heberle, From Democracy to Nazism, a Regional 
Case Study on Political Parties in Germany, Baton Rouge 1945. 
25) Ibid., S. 64. 
26) Ibid., SS. 15-16, 52. 
27) Ibid" SS. 93·95. It is pointed out that "village community" (Dorfgemeinschaft) was 
kept more intensely in the Geest zone than the Marsch zone or the hill zone (East 
Holstein), but main components of the community are community ties which still re-
mained after the solution of the community as a result of abolition of field compulsion 
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has to be placed on the fact that the penetration of the Nazis differed corre-
spondingly to the difference of socio-economic structure of rural districts in 
Schleswig-Holstein. 
Here we have, first of all, to discuss the functions of the crisis as a factor 
inviting radicalism of rural population. The agitation activities of the Nazis 
started as early as 1927 in Schleswig-Holstein when the first sign of agricultural 
crisis appeared2". The mOre the commercial farming specialized, the more easily 
they have impact of the crisis, so that the footholds of the Nazis were established 
in the Geest zone and the Marsch zone where more such farming existed parti-
cularly in Schleswig-Holstein. This can be assumed from figures listed in Table 
329). On the contrary, the Nazi advancement was made moderately at the areas 
where the crisis had operated rather gently since multiple agriculture covering 
dairy farming, stock farming, corn raising, etc. was developed as Angeln dis-
trict located in the northern part of the hill zone of Schleswig-Holstein were the 
big farmer class (20-100 ha) were dominant. It was not until 1932 when prices 
of milk and cereals dropped suddenly that the crisis acted acutely in Angeln 
district and it is reported that the artisan class and the "small" people (Kleine 
Leute) turned to the Nazis at first and then the upper stratum of the peasantry 
became to support the Nazis along the beginning of 193330l • 
Secondly, we have to take up the problem of difference of "social stratifi-
cation" (soziale Schichtung) of rural population among the three zones mentioned 
above in Schleswig-Holstein. It is said that the Nazis achieved the first and 
biggest success at the areas where ties of village community were strongly 
maintained without distinct class differentiation among rural population. The 
Geest corresponded to such a case. It was because progress of class differentia-
tion was moderate in general in the Geest zone, while an intense social tension 
with discrimination of social standing mixed with class antagonism existed be-
tween the widely formed the big farmer class and agricultural labourers in the 
Marsch zone, and between large landowners remaining in East Holstein in the 
east southern part and agricultural labourers in the hill zone. The difference of 
this kind depending on respective zones is clarified in that agricultural labourers 
in the Marsch zone mainly supported the Social Democratic Party (SPD) or the 
Communist Party (KPD) as was the case with the hill zone, while those in the 
Geest zone voted, though thin in stratum, for the National Peoples Party (DNVP) 
in almost all cases and secondly for the Nazi Party.31) 
(Flurzwang) and division of common (AUmende), and their remnant can be seen in CO~ 
operative collaboration of peasants in case of embankment or drainage work in relation 
to the Marsch zone (ibid., SS. 53, SO, 95). 
28) Ibid., S. 160. 
29) Ibid., S. 97. 
30) Ibid., SS. 70, 73-74, 76. 
31) Ibid., S. 100. 
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TABLE 3 Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties in Rural Communities (under 2,000 
population) of Schleswig-Holstein (1919-1932 I) 
Election Year NSD- Land-I DNVP 1 DVP ILande~-DDpl Other 1 SPD I USPD I KPD and Area AP volk partel Partles 
Marsch Zone 1 
1919 - - 7.6 9.0 8.2_29.3 - 45.9 - -37.5 
1921 - - 29.0 20. I 5.0_ 6.4 0.1 27.6 6.4 5.4 
II. 4 
1924 I 6.4 - 40.6 10.4 - 9.3 5.8 19.0 1.3 7.2 
1924 II 3.1 - 41. 4 II. 5 - II. 5 3.4 24.7 - 4.4 
1928 7.9 0.5 29.6 9.3 - 4.6 15.4 27.6 - 5.1 
1930 41.2_ 7.0 5.3 3.1 - 2.8 6.8 25.5 - 8.3 
48.2 
-I 1932 I 61. 6 - 6.2 - - 4.0 19.4 - 8.8 
I 
Geest Zone 
38.4_21.81 1919 - - 3.9 4.7 0.1 31. I - -60.2 : 
1921 - - 25.3 13.0 27.5_ 5.71 0.9 22.1 3.5 2.0 33.2 ; 
1924 I 9.4 - 47.3 11. 7 - 6.71 6.9 14.1 0.5 3.4 , 
1924 II 2.4 - 49.9 18. I - 8.61 3.3 16. I - 1.6 
1928 15.9 1.1 24.3 14.0 - 3.61 21. 7 17.5 - 1.9 
1930 45.9_14.2 3.7 3.7 - 3.0 II. 6 14.7 - 3.2 
50.1 
1932 I 78.7 - 3.8 - - - 4.5 9.7 - 3.3 
Hill Zone 
1919 - - 15.8 6.3 14.3_21.7 0.3 39.6 2.0 -36.0 
1921 - - 28.2 15.6 6.2_ 7.8 0.4 34.6 4.9 2.3 14.0 
19241 5.5 - 38.7 13.7 - 6.7 2.8 24.0 1.0 7.6 
1924 II 1.9 - 40.9 15.7 - 6.9 2.0 29.2 - 3.4 
1928 2.0 0.4 32.7 15.0 - 4.3 10.0 32.6 - 3.0 
1930 24.3_10.4 10.9 6.1 - 5.2 10.4 27.8 - 4.9 
34.7 I 
I 1932 I 57. I - 10.0 - - -1 4.9 21. 4 - 6.6 
* Marsch Zone=Eiderstedt, North and South Dithmarschen. 
Geest Zone=Kreis Rendsburg, Flensburg, Schleswig, North and South Dithmarschen. 
Hill Zone=Flensburg, Schleswig, Eckernforde, PIon, Oldenburg, Landesteil Lo.beck 
(Freistaat Oldenburg). 
Similar situation appeared in East Prussia, it was reported. At the election 
in July, 1932, the Nazis gained the biggest success in Masuren district of peasant 
type, while the National Peoples Party, the Social Democratic Party and the 
Communist Party won comparatively high percentages of votes in typical large 
land ownership area with differentiated classes32). 
Thus it is made clear that the social basis of Nazi penetration is not con-
32) R. Heberle, Hauptprobleme der politischen Soziologie, Stuttgart 1967, S.232. It is quoted 
as Hauptproblem. 
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cerned with urban districts but rural districts in general and that the problems 
lie in areas where middle and small farmers were maintained rather than the 
areas where large landowners or big farmers governed in respect to rural dis-
tricts. 
Let us consider the relation of social classification of the peasantry in Schles-
wig-Holstein with the advancement of the Nazis. (1) Lower limit of indepen-
dent peasant farming lies in a scope of some 10 ha. (2) A scope of 20 ha or more 
begins to be too large for family labourers. (3) In case of a scope of 50 ha or 
more, employed labourers become necessary remarkably and farmers are not 
engaged in farm labour except for harvest time. (4) Non-independent peasant 
farming is a scope of 10 or less ha, and it is classified into (a) farming of a 
scope of 5-8 ha which depends on interval wage labour for the sake of big far-
mers and large landowners and (b) farming of a scope of 2-3 ha which depends 
on regular wage labour for supplementing income. (5) The lowest limit of 
peasant farming of a scope of 0.5-2 ha is held mainly by day labourers and farm 
labourers and utilization of such a small land fragment helps to supplement 
their wages. Such farm labourers occupied naturally higher weight in the areas 
where big farmers and large landowners were dominant, and in such an area 
the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party relatively gained success 
in the elections. 
On the contrary, such an advancement of the Social Democratic Party or 
the Communist Party was not recognized in the areas where there existed small 
farmer class with a scope of 2-10 ha and middle farmer class with a scope of 
10-20 ha. It was in these areas that the Nazis achieved success in election33). 
The same can be said to some extent in relation to the areas where big 
farmers with a scope of 20-100 ha governed, but since the opportunity of penetra-
tion of the Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party became larger in 
proportion to the dependence rate of farming on employment of external wage 
labourers, it can be roughly spoken that the landmark between favorable and 
unfavorable conditions for Nazi advancement existed between peasant farming 
scope of 20 ha and 50 haM). 
With regard to indebtedness problem of farmers, peasant farming of 5-10 ha 
showed higher debt rate than peasant farming of 20-100 ha, which means that 
middle and small farmers suffered from debt most35). The correlation of the 
debt rate of the farmers to the advancement of the Nazis has been detected not 
33) Th. Geiger, Die soziale Schichtung des deutschen Volkes, S. 90. The Geiger in general 
attends to the fact that the Nazis gained the most percentages of votes in the typical 
small peasant area, and suggests that especially lower stratum among the middle and 
small supported the Nazis. 
34) R. Heberle, Landbevolkerung, SS. 114-116. 
35) Ibid., S. 133. 
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only in Schleswig-Holstein but in East Prussia and Pomerania36). 
Anyway, although the advancement of the Nazis was based on the radicalized 
political aspirations of the middle and small farmer class shocked by the agri-
cultural crisis, emphasis has to be put on the fact that the Nazi advancement 
could not solely be attributed directly to crisis but the essential reasons of the 
so-called "shift of social regrouping" (soziale Umschichtungen) proceeded inside 
Weimar Republic running as undercurrent. 
The problem of land reform in 1918 Revolution had been converged upon 
the line of the internal colonization policy, and this policy disorganized the 
continued long-term tenants relations (Zeitpachtverhaltnisse) particularly in East 
Holstein. Now that the colonization corporation made its appearance as a creditor 
instead of the patriarchal ruling by former large landowners of Junkers towards 
the farmers emancipated from conventional long-term tenant relations and the 
farmers newly colonized through the internal colonization policy, the farmers 
felt as if they were actually governed by "Finance Capital" under the pressure 
of no other than "Slavery of Interest" (Zinsknechtschaft)37). 
In parallel with changes occurring inside the rural districts we should not 
disregard the loss of political power which the upper strata of rural population, 
particularly large landowners of Junkers had possessed in Prussia in prewar 
days or exercised in the Reich by way of Prussia. Here will be specifically 
taken up the abolition of Prussian Three-class Electoral Law (Dreiklassen-
Wahlrecht) which accorded with the proclamation of the Council of People's 
Commissars (Rat der Volksbeauftragten) on November 12, 1918, and the Reich 
Electoral Law (Reichswahlgesetz) on November 30, 1918, and the dissolution of 
the Estates Districts (Gutsbezirke)38) in Prussia according to the law of December 
27, 1927, which embodied the proclamation of Prussian Government on November 
13, 1918. The former was the cornerstone which supported the mechanism of 
so-called J unker-Prussian ruling in the Reich and the latter had acted as the 
nucleus of the system of non-economic compulsion (auBerokonomischer Zwang) 
which played a part to insure the reproduction of semi-feudal production relations 
of Junkerdom composing the material basis of such the machanism. Political 
power status of large landowners greatly swayed in Schleswig-Holstein because 
of collapse of these two main pillars to support them. It cannot be dismissed 
that the struggle between the conservative parties such as the National Peoples 
Party and the Nazis in rural districts of Schleswig-Holstein had an aspect of 
the struggle between conservatives of large landowners and big farmers and 
politically radicalized middle class in rural districts expecting Nazi politics in 
respect to intention of the large landowners for reconstruction of political ruling 
36) W. Kaltefleiter, op. cit" S. 56. 
37) R. Heberle, Landbevolkerung, S, 134. 
3B) Heinz Maull, Die Landgemeindeordnungen Preujens, 2. Auftage, Berlin 1930. S. 173. 
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-intention for restoration to Imperial Germany39). 
In Schleswig-Holstein all the efforts for conservative large landowners and 
big farmers to restore political ruling were in vain, and as a result the former 
rural upper classes were excluded from political leadership status because they 
were regarded as cooperators to the "system", so that reign forced penetration 
by the Nazis brought about the change of political leaders in the rural districts, 
thus giving a status for political power to the middle class40). For the middle 
39) R. Heberle, Landbevolkerung, S. 136 f. Further study is necessary as to what extent 
such an aspect is generalized in rural districts to the east of the Elbe. Refer on this 
point to the above~mentioned papers by O. Murase as well as "Leaders and Masses in 
the Weimar Republic", in: Political Leadership in Mass Democracies, The Annuals of Japa-
nese Political Science Association, Tokyo 1955. O. Murase makes in them an assumption 
that the supporters of the National Peoples Party tended not to oppose to but to co-
operate with the Nazis in the rural districts, too and a certain division of labour in 
politics was made possible between both parties because of difference in supporters 
judging from the inclination of vote for the Nazis and National Peoples Party at the 
end of Weimar Republic (The Annuals, p. 66). From this viewpoint O. Murase claims 
that the cooperation between the Nazis and the Junkers was thought to be a sort of co-
alition and not their unification. It is true that a sort of coalition was formed between 
the Nazis and the Junkers but it cannot be disregarded that the supporters of both sides 
were duplicated and latent opposition relation existed between them if remarkable ad-
vancement of the Nazis was ascertained in the areces where the National Peoples Party 
retreated greatly (Vg1. Peter Wulf, Die politische Haltung des schleswig-holsteinischen 
Handwerks 1928-1932, KOln und Oplanden 1969, S. 65. See Table 3). 
40) The behaviour of the artisans having a significant meaning together with the peasantry 
out of the old middle class in Weimar Republic have already been clarified in Wilhelm 
Bock, Stand und Bedeutung der Handwerkerbundebewegung, Stuttgart 1932, but no montion 
has been made of the penetration of the Nazis to the artisans. In this respect the above-
mentioned book by P. Wulf shed light on the case in Schleswig-Holstein. It reveals 
that the parties supported by the artisans shifted roughly from the Democratic Party 
(DDP) to the National Peoples Party (DNVP), the Economic Party (WP), and Nazi 
Party (NSDAP) in Weimar Republic. Particularly the artisans in rural districts and in 
middle and small cities suffering from deteriorated economic conditions began to strongly 
oppose Weimar Republic-the "system"-which ran short of the policies for the middle 
class (Mittelstandspolitik) with 1929 Crisis as a turning point and shifted their support 
from the Economic Party to the Nazi Party by staging a decisive swing explicitly to "strug-
gle against the system" (Kampf gegen das System) in the middle of 1931. The political 
intention of the radicalized artisans class, anti-capitalistic and antiasocialistic in nature, 
had appeared against the Social Democratic Party above all which had been regarded as 
a supporter of Weimar Republic or the current I'system" (Cf. P. Wulf, op. cit., SS. 26, 
36, 46, 50, 54, 56, 85, 88, 110-112, 126. 145). William Sheridan Al1en, who depicted de-
tailed situation of the rise and ruling of the Nazis in Nordheim, a small town to the 
south of Hanover with a population of 10,000 in 1930, analyzes the structure of strata 
of the town in the following way: (a) Lower stratum (unskilled and semi-skilled la-
bourers) 37 %, (b) Lower middle stratum (skilled labourers, salaried employees, peasants, 
rentiers) 32 %, (c) Upper middle stratum (master artisans, civil servants, businessmen) 
27 %, (d) Upper stratum (businessmen, self-manager, professionals) 4 %, and at the same 
time points out that the broad strata of petty bourgeoisie formed the social basis of 
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class in each village who developed movements centered on "communities of 
fate" (Schicksalgemeinschaften) , the new politics of the Nazis advocating a 
platform of ruralism seemed to realize their hope41l • 
(2) Now let us turn our eyes on the rural districts where Catholic was 
prevalent in Bavaria from Protestant-dominant rural districts in Schleswig-
Holstein. Bavaria had widely distributed middle and small farmers and was 
the spring place of the Nazis. When the percentages of votes obtained by 
TABLE 4 . Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties in Schleswig-Holstein, Bavaria and 
the Reich (1920-1932 I) 
Election 
!NSDAP Land- ! DNVP ! DVP DDP ! zeotr-! SPD USPD!KPD Other Year and 
Area volk umBVP Parties 




Reich , - - 14.4 13.9 8.5 19.6 21. 6 18.8 1.7 1.5 I 
Schles.-Hol. i - - 20.5 18.4 9.4 0.8 37.3 3.0 6.1 4.5 
Bavaria I I - - 7.0 10.5 8. I I 38.9 16.4 13.0 2.0 4.1 
1924 I i 
Reich 2.6 - I 19.5 9.2 5. 7 16.6 20.5 0.8 12. 7 12.5 
Schles.-Hol. 7.4 - I 31. 0 12. I 8.1 1.0 24.9 - 10.2 5.3 
Bavaria 5.4 - 9.5 2. I 3.0 35.2 17.7 0.5 8.0 17.0 
1924 II i i i 
9.0 I Reich 3.0 - 20.5 10. I 6.3 16.1 26.01 0.3 8. 7 
Schles.-Hol. 2. 7 - 33.0 14.6 8.7 1.1 30.3 . - 6. 7 2.9 
Bavaria 5.1 - 14.4 4.3 3.8 34.6 I 21.1 0.4 5.1 11. 2 
1928 i , 
Reich 2.6 2.9 14.2 8. 7 4.91 15.2 29.8 - 10.6 11.1 
Schles.-Hol. 4.0 0.3 23.0 13.7 5.7 1.1 35.3 - 7.9 9.0 
Bavaria 6.4 0.1 10.0 3.8 3.1 31. 1 24.4 
-I 3.8 17.4 
1930 I 
Reich 18.3 3.2 7.0 4.5 3.8 15. 7 24.5 - 13.1 9.9 
Schles.-Hol. 27.0 3.8 6.1 7.3 4.7 1.0 29.8 - 10.6 ! 9.7 
Bavaria 17.9 4.3 
I 
2.0 1.9 1.8 31. 1 20.9 - 5.9 14.2 
1932 I 
Reich 37.3 0.3 I 5.9 1.2 1.0 15.7 21. 6 - 14.3 2. 7 
Schles.-Hol. 51. 0 - 6.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 26.2 - 10.7 1.6 
Bavaria 32.9 - 3. 1 0.9 0.5 32.3 17. 1 , - 8.3 4.9 
Nazi movements and the Nazi victory can be elucidated from aspirations of bourgeois 
strata of Nordheim to suppress the lower class, particularly their political representative, 
the Social Democratic Party (Cr. W. S. Allen, Das haben WiT nicht gewollt. Die national-
sozialistische Machtergreifung in einer Kleinstadt 1930-1935, Cuter,loh 1965, SS. 24, 280. 
Anyway note that the intention of the middle class had appeared against Weimar Repu-
blic and the Social Democratic Party. 
41) R. Heberle, Landbevolkuerung, S. 171. 
TABLE 5 Percentages of Votes Obtained by Parties in Urban Communities of Bavaria and Rural Communities of 
Bavarian Middle Franconia 
Number of Ratio of Population Ratio of Popula- Ratio of Popula- Percentages of Votes Obtained 
Qualified Classified by Religion tion of Forestry tion of by Parties in the Diet (Reich 
Persons 16. 6.1933 and Agriculture Labourers stag)-Electrion of July 31, 1932 
Unit: 1,000 Catholic I Protes;~nt 17. 5.1939 17. 5.1939 NSDAP\ DNVP \ BVP \ SPD \ KPD 1932 I 
--
-----
I Urban Communities 
Monchen (Upper Bavaria) 517.0 8U 15.2 l.l 40.3 28.9 3.2 37.4 17.8 4.4 
NUrnberg 302.9 32.1 62. 7 1.2 47.6 37.8 2.9 8.4 33.5 12.6 (Middle Franconia) 
Augsburg (Swabia) I 120.6 79.0 18.9 1.3 48.5 23.1 4.2 30.3 26.7 12.8 
II Rural Communities 
Ansbach 22.0 5.1 94.6 49.6 I 23.5 76.3 13.2 3.0 4.3 0.8 (Middle Franconia) I DinkelsbUhl II 15.9 15.1 84.5 59.4 21. 0 71. 2 10.4 7.4 8.8 0.9 
Eichstatt II 14.9 97.7 2.3 54.3 27.3 18.8 1.1 63.4 7.2 5.5 
Erlangen II 9.2 18.4 80.9 29.8 41. 5 48.1 7.2 7.3 31. I 3.4 
Feuchtwangen II 16.7 35.9 63. 7 58.9 22.3 53.8 10.1 29.4 3.6 0.4 
Furth II 20.3 7.0 92.4 27.0 45.1 60.2 6.6 1.7 23.1 5.9 
Gunzenhausen II 20.8 18. 1 80.6 55.5 19.0 72.5 8.9 11.7 3.9 0.9 
Hersbruck II 15.6 6.6 93.4 37.3 29.6 60.8 10.0 2.8 20.2 3.0 
Hilpoltstein II 14.7 75.9 23.7 61.1 21.7 31. 5 1.9 60.0 3.1 1.2 
Lauf II 18. 7 41. 0 58.0 18.5 49.5 37.3 4.4 14.7 28.0 12.2 
Neustadt a. d. Aisch II 20.4 3.0 96.4 50. 7 22.3 79.2 10.0 1.1 6.9 1.1 
Nurnberg II 17.2 10.9 88.3 23.2 43.8 58.9 4.0 3.5 25.8 5.1 
Rothenburg ob der Tauber 12.4 5.8 93. 7 70.8 18.8 83.0 9.8 3.9 1.6 0.4 II 
Scheinfeld II 11. 7 40.9 58.0 59.4 2C.7 62.3 5.0 22.5 5.9 1.1 
Schwabach II 22.4 24.3 75.1 33.2 39.1 47.0 9.3 10.3 25.9 3.5 
Uffenheim II 20.4 6.3 93.1 51. 3 25.4 81.0 10.8 3.3 3.1 0.4 










parties are compared between Schleswig-Holstein and Bavaria in Table ( 42), 
one notices tbat Bavarian Peoples Party (BVP) , a Catholic party separated 
from the Center Party, maintained a strong influence and the advancement of 
the Nazis slowed down at a rate less than the national average in Catholic 
governed Bavaria as against Schleswig-Holstein were Protestants were dominant 
with least influence of the Catholic Center Party. 
However, it is needed to carry out deeper study on the situation on the 
basis of Table 543>. In the Geest zone in rural districts of Schleswig-Holstein 
where the Nazis made the most remarkable advancement, the middle and small 
farmers or the so-called "family-sized farm" were dominant, doing marginal 
farming because of poor, sandy soils in most cases.44) Next will be taken up 
a study on Middle Franconia in Bavaria featuring such the farming. As given 
in Table 5, there existed a remarkable difference in percentages of votes ob-
tained by parties depending on the difference of the ratio of population clas-
sified by religion and the ratio of population of labourers in rural districts of 
Middle Franconia. 
The Nazis obtained an overwhelming percentages of votes in the areas, 
where Protestant was dominant and the ratio of population of labourers was 
low, as shown in 76.3 % in Ansbach, 71.2 % in Dinkelsbiihl, 72.5% in Gunzen-
hausen, 79.2 % in Neustadt a. d. Aisch, 83.0 % in Rothenburg ob der Tauber, 
81.0 % in Uffenheim45). Here are given the Nazi strongholds corresponding to 
the Geest zone in Schleswig-Holstein. 
However, in Catholic-dominant areas in the rural districts in the same 
Middle Franconia with less ratio of popUlation of labourers Bavarian Peoples 
Party occupied supremacy. It is so in the cases of 63.4 % in Eichstatt and 60.0 % 
in Hilpoltstein in percentages of votes obtained by the Bavarian Peoples Party. 
In the rural districts of East Prussia Catholic-dominant Ermland had re-
lative immunity from penetration of Nazis in the election of July, 1932, show-
ing no more than 15-25 % of votes for the Nazis in comparison with other sor-
rounding areas where Protestant was dominant and the Nazi advancement was 
remarkable. Such situations can be detected in Catholic-dominant Westphalian 
districts and the border of Upper Silesia with dominant Ca tholic,sl . 
In this way, different political behaviour was expressed between Catholic 
42) Charles P. Loomis and J. Alle~ Beegle, The Spread of German Na-zism in Rural Areas, 
in: American Sociological Review, Volume 11 Number 6, 1946, p. 728. 
43) Composed from M. Hagmann, op. cit., Tabellenwerk, S8. 1-17. 
44) C. P. Loomis and J. A. Beegle, op. cit., p. 726. 
45) In respect to difference of economic conditions among these areas refer to Die landliche 
Arbeitsverfassung im Westen und Suden des Reiches, herausgegeben und bearbeitet von 
Konrad Meyer und Klaus Thiede, Heidelberg 1941, SS. 191-211. 
46) R. Heberle, Hauptprobleme, S. 240. 
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and Protestant although they belonged to the same strata47l • Protestant is not 
bound to obey a particular political party 4B). On the contrary, in the areas 
where Caholic was dominant, the obedience of the Catholic electorate to the 
church, the traditional obligation to vote for the Center Party since the war of 
culture (Kulturkampf), the influence of Christian trade unions, artisan's unions, 
societies of university graduates and other Catholic interest associations, and 
the like prevented the Nazis penetration into these districts.4" 
When taking into consideration these points in relation to major large cities 
in Bavaria, Bavarian Peoples Party held strong influence and obtained 37.4 % 
of votes in the election of July, 1932, at MUnchen, "Capital of Movement"SO) 
(Hauptstadt der Bewegung), since Catholic was dominant, while the Nazis only 
obtained 28.9 % of votes far below the national average rate. However, at 
NUrnberg, a large city in Middle Franconia, where the Nazis frequently held 
their party congress, Protestants dominated and the Nazis obtained 37.8 % of 
votes slightly over the national average and the Social Democratic Party 37.8 % 
of votes considerably over the national average rate. Thus the tendency pre-
sented more clearly in rural districts in Middle Franconia can be detected 
similarly in large cities in Bavaria. 
In this way the resistive power of "politically organized Catholicism"511 
against the Nazi had ignorable significance. Furthermore, since the Catholic 
strata organized in the Center Party or Bavarian Peoples Party was duplicated 
actually with the strata into which the Nazis intended to advance, hatred of 
the Nazis toward the "system" was more seriously focused on the Center Party52). 
Anyway, even if the functions of the World Economic Crisis and features of 
the socio-economic structure conditioned basically the advancement of the Nazis, 
it would be impossible to analyze the matters concretely with only such view-
points. We have to take into account that no other than "Religion" played a 
role of independent factor in the formation of political wills. 
The progress of urbanization, however, brought forth an inclination to 
slacken binding of the Catholic electorate to the Center Party5", thus reduced 
the meaning of being Catholic. It was so in the big industrial districts, parti-
cularly in the heavy industrial districts. There the labourers belonging to big 
industry tended to become involved in the Social Democra tic Party through 
47) Vgl. M. Rainer Lepsius, Extremen NatiQnalismus, Stuttgart 1966, S. S2. 
48) W. Kaltefleiter, op. cit.. S. 52. 
49) R. Heberle, Hauptprobleme, S. 240; M. R. Lepsius 1 op. cit., S. 33. 
50) Karl Borcherding, Munch,mer Zeitgeschicht, 1918-1945,3. Aufiage, Monchen 1967, S. 
27. 
51) M. R. Lepsius, op. eit., S. 32. 
52) Th. Geiger, op. cit., S. 112. 
53) W. Kaltefieiter, op. cit., S. 51. 
TABLE 6 Perc;entages of Votes Obtained by Parties in Urban Communities 
I 
I Berlin I Dortmund I Leipzig I Riesa Reich Berlin- I Berlin- I Berlin- (Westphalia- (Dresden-
Wedding Zehlendorf Steglitz South) (Leipzig) Bautzen) 
Number of Qualified Persons 144 211 2161 (19321) , , 266,336 1 47,104 I 139,857 I 370,535 j 500,892 I 17,885 I 
Percentages of Votes Obtained % by Parties 1928 1930 1932 1928 1930 1932 1928 1930 1932 1928 1930 1932 1928 1930 1932 1928 1930 1932 
1932 I I I I I I I 
NSDAP 37.3 0.8 9.0 19.3 1.8 17.7 36.4 2.9 23.3 42.1 0.6 8.3 19.6 2.3 13.8 23.3 1.3 13.6 28.4 
DNVP 5.9 4.1 8.7 4.6 30.1 21. I 19.4 26.5 17.7 15.6 5.6 3.9 4.9 7.4 3.7 4.5 9.5 4.7 5.4 
DVP 1.2 2.6 1.6 0.2 18.5 II. 7 3.0 16.7 1l.8 2.1 13.9 8.6 1.3 16.6 13.0 2.9 10.5 6.9 2.6 
Zentrum 15.7 2.6 2.7 3.4 3.7 4.0 7.4 3.4 3.6 5.4 18.8 17.4 18.6 0.8 0.8 1.5 1.2 1.2 1.4 
DSP (=DDP) 1.0 4.6 3.0 0.9 10.7 8.9 3.2 9.1 7. I 2.4 4.5 2.5 0.6 6.7 3.4 2.0 3.8 3.6 1.0 
SPD 21.6 34.027.027.8 23.219.721.2 22.918.819.0137.128.423.7 37.734.934.1 43.6 43.1 38.2 
KPD 14.3 40.342.942.6 5.8 7.4 8.5 11.29.612.312.820.227.9 17.118.530.3 13.3 12.5 II. 2 
~--. ------~ 
Social Structure (1925) % 
Agriculture, Forestry & Fishery 30.5 0.4 2.6 1.4 0.6 0.6 2.6 
Industry & Handicraft 41.4 58.6 24.1 31.2 58.3 47.7 57.2 
Commerce & Transportation 16.5 23.7 23.9 30.7 22.7 30. I 21.6 
Management & Profess.ion, etc. 6.5 7. I 22.3 17.7 6.8 8.9 7. I 
Household, etc. 5.1 2.3 13.8 6.1 4.3 2.8 2.4 
--- ----- ... __ . ...... _.- ---_.-
----
-.- .. _----_ ...... 
_ .. __ ._ .. --
-- ------- -------
---------- ........ _. __ .. .. _-----_._--_.- . .... 
Self-management 17.3 13.0 30.5 21.7 12. I 19.1 12.8 
Civil Servants & Salaried 16.5 22.3 34.4 44.6 23.6 33.4 29.1 Employees 




Sectarian Belonging % 
Catholic 32.5 8.8 9.7 9.6 40.0 3.6 4.8 
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the medium of trade unions irrespective of sectarian belonging, and the trade 
unions had the same function for the sake of the Social Democra tic Party as 
the Catholic Church for the Center Party5". It is also said that unemployed 
labourers of big industry tended to vote for the Communist Party irrespective 
of sectarian belongingS". 
(3) Next, big industrial districts will become the subjects of our study. 
In the electoral districts of Rhine-Westphalia, Berlin and Saxony, all major 
industrial districts under Weimar Republic, the Nazi advancement was not so 
remarkable except Chemnitz-Zwickau as given in Table 2. 
First of all, Berlin will be observed. Berlin, being classified into 20 districts, 
had the electoral districts of Berlin, Potsdam I and Potsdam II. Here, com-
parison will be carried out among Wedding district belonging to Berlin electoral 
district, Zehlendorf district belonging to Potsdam II electoral district and Steglitz 
district belonging also to Potsdam II electoral district. Table 656> show that these 
three districts clarify different percentage of votes obtained by parties in reflec-
tion of difference of their socio-economic structures. 
In Berlin the influence of the Center Party was feeble because of dominance 
of Protestants. Now, in Wedding district an overwhelming number of industrial 
labourers and unemployed labourers resided57>, who were mainly composed of 
labourers in big factories of electric industry, mechanical industry, metal in-
dustry, and the like, and they contributed to establish the strongholds for the 
Social Democratic Party and the Communist Party. However, it cannot be denied 
that the Social Democratic Party tended downward amid the World Economic 
Crisis and it is assumed that some portion of its supporters shifted to the 
Communist Party or even the Nazi Party. 
As is well-known, although the Social Democratic Party took the policy of 
"Tolerance" towards Briining Cabinet on the basis of the theory of so-called 
"smaller evilness" for the purpose of drawing a clear line from the Communist 
Party, the Communist Party directed fire not on Briining, Papen or Schleicher 
who had arranged for a road to Nazi dictatorship, but on the Social Democratic 
Party on the basis of the theory of so-called "social Fascism", with which it 
had to establish a united front against Fascism5s,. Thus the labour front of 
54) Ibid., S. 52. 
55) Cf. ibid., SS. 67-70. 
56) Statistik des Deutschen Reichs, Bd. 403-404 (Berufszahlung. Die berufliche und soziale 
Gliederung der BevMkerung in den Landern und Landesteilen) Berlin 1929; Bd. 434 
(Die Wahlen zum Reichstag) Berlin 1935 j Bd. 451 (Volkszahlung. Die Bevt.lkerung des 
Deutschen Reichs nach den Ergebnissen der Volkszlihlung 1933) Berlin 1936; K. D. 
Bracher, op. eit., SS. 652-654. 
57) cr. A. Rosenberg, op. cit., S. 135. 
58) Vgl. K. D. Bracher, op. cit., S. 379; Lothar Berthold, Das Pragramm der KPD zur na-
tiona len und sozialen Bejreiung des deutschen Volkes vom August 1930, Berlin 1956, SS. 
169-171; Yasushi Yamaguchi, Adolf Hitler, Tokyo 1962, pp. 197-202. 
22 E. OHNO 
Germany entered into a tragic situation of split but, be the matter as it may, 
in Wedding district percentages of votes obtained by the Nazis was checked at 
a level of 19.3 % even in the election of July, 1932, because a firm left-wing 
majority was maintained there in the form of stronger the Communist Party 
than the Social Democratic Party. 
On the contrary, the situation considerably differed in Zehlendorf district. 
The district comprised suburban residential quarters for rather wealthy citizens 
where civil servants, salaried employees and self-managers59> occupied higher 
weight in population and the ratio of commerce and management corresponded 
almost equally to industry. The conservative National Peoples Party had ma-
intained relatively strong influence to cope with such a social structure, and the 
middle class occupied a high weight together with the -upper class, so that per-
cen tage of votes obtained by the Nazi reached 36.4 % nearly the same level as the 
national average rate in the election of July, 1932. In this district, moreover, 
a typical residential quarter of civil servants, and salaried employees, the new 
middle class weighted heavier than the old one among the middle class and so 
it will be necessary to understand percen tage of votes obtained by the Nazis of 
42.1 % surpassing the national average rate in the election of July, 1932, in com-
parison with such a social structure60'. 
When a reference is made on Leipzig, a large city in industrial district of 
Saxony, and Dortmund, a large city in industrial district of Rhine-Westphalia, 
we can find out a nearly similar phenomenon there to that detected in Wedding 
district of Berlin, if disregarding that the Center Party had kept deep-rooted 
influence in Dortmund where Catholics occupied a rate of 40.0 % of all the re-
ligious population. In either large city the advancement of the Communist 
Party developed in a marked contrast to the wear of the Social Democratic Party 
under the impact of the World Economic Crisis, and it is conceivable that the 
existence of the Center Party and formation of firm left-wing majority in Dort-
mund and the existence of an overwhelming left-wing majority in Leipzig suc-
cessfully checked the advancement there of the Nazis. 
It is natural to admit that various bourgeois parties except the Center Party 
broken down as a result of not only a landside swing of their supporters to the 
Nazis but a shift of even some part of supporters of left-wing parties to the Nazis 
amid impact of the World Economic Crisis and thus inviting "meteoric rise" 
59) "Self-manager" (Selbs!lindige) contains owners (Eigentilmer), lease-holders (Plichter), 
directors (Directoren) and business men (Geschaftsfilhrer) in its category I and it is re· 
garded as an index to find out the "statistical middle class" (statistischer Mittelstand) 
together with "civil servants and salaried employees" (Beamte und Angestellte) CW. 
Kaltefteiter, op. cit., S. 54). Note the fact that the old middle class is all included in 
this uself.manager". No mention will be necessary on that the new middle class is in 
eluded in the category of "civil servants and salaried employees". 
60) Cf. S. M. Lipse!, op. ci!., SS. 413-416. 
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of the Nazis, but it is also clear that influential left-wing parties were still alive 
in large cities in big industrial districts to check the penetration of the Nazis. 
The Nazis could not destroy "Supremacy of 'Red' "61) in large cities. 
The political meaning of such a socio-economic structure, particularly re-
sistive power of working class in large cities (100,000 or more population) of 
big industrial districts against the right-wing radicalism above all could not have 
generality in middle cities (20,OQO-IOO,000 population)or rural cities (2,000-5,000 
population) where different situations were detected considerably. This point 
will be discussed in respect to two middle cities in industrial districts of Saxony 
in particular. Riesa is a city in electoral district of Dresden-Bautzen and Werdau 
is a city in electoral district of Chemnitz-Zwickau. 
As a reference was made previously, an unusual high percentage of votes 
was marked by the Nazis in electoral district of Chemnitz-Zwickau among major 
industrial districts. As given in Table 2, the Nazis marked percentages of votes 
in electoral districts of major industrial districts in the election of July, 1932; 
20.2% in Koln-Aachen, 24.6 % in Berlin, 25.7 % in Westphalia-North, 27.0 % in 
DUsseldorf-West, 27.2% in Westphalia-South, 31.6% in DUsseldorf-East, etc. These 
percentages of votes were comparatively low below the national average rate, 
but percentage of votes only in Chemnitz-Zwickau showed 47.0 % far above the 
national average rate. The two cities were selected to shed light on this 
result. 
In reviewing the results of the election of July, 1932, the Nazis marked 
remarkably different percentages of votes between Riesa and Werdau, both 
middle cities of which belonged to the same industrial district of Saxony. Urban 
populaticm of Werdau was composed of 59.0 % by labourers, and industry and 
handicraft occupied 66.7 % in the social structure, so that it was a city most 
industrialized. It had a rate of unemployment of 28.3 % at that time62>. In 
Werdau the population engaged in textile industry occupied 31.3 % of all the 
urban population, followed by commerce with 10.5 % of the population, and 
middle and small business marked a high weight, so that the industrial struc-
ture in which the so-called "middle class industry"63l (mittelstandische Industrie) 
was dominant or the industria!" structure in which middle and small business 
was dominant, was maintained. Urban population of Riesa was also composed 
of 54.0 % by labourers, and industry and handicraft occupied 57.2 % in the 
social structure, so that Riesa was a highly industrialized city. It had a rate 
of unemployment of 31.8 % at that time. It can be said that the industrial 
structure in which big industry was dominant was found out there on the con-
trary, since steel industry acted as the nucleus of the industrial structure, ab-
61) K. D. Bracher, op. cit., S. 115. 
62) Cf. W. Kaltefleiter, op. cit., S. 49. 
63) Ibid., S. 48. 
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sorbing 20.9 % of all the urban population. The status of Riesa, which played 
a role of stronghold of the Social Democratic Party originally, did not sway des-
pite the impact of the World Economic Crisis and the firm existence of left-wing 
parties including the Communist Party checked the advancement of the Nazis 
at a level of 28.4 % even in the election of July, 1932, while in Werdau the 
Nazis marked a percentage of votes of 36.9 % in the election of September, 
1930, and 53.4 % in the election of July, 1932, since the influence of the Social 
Democratic Party declined greatly and even some of its supporters turned to 
the Nazis amid the World Economic Crisis. 
In such a contradictory tendency, in other word, in comparison of Werdau, 
a ci ty of textile industry where middle and small business was dominant, wi th 
Riesa, a city of steel industry where big industry was dominant, the significance 
of problems is displayed in the form of pure cultivation, as it were. The dif-
ference of organizing power of trade unions cannot be disregarded because it 
brought forth such a situation. Steel industry and coal & mining industry 
operated under big business with higher organization rate of trade unions, while 
textile industry was based on middle and small business with a higher rate of 
women workers causing less organization rate of trade unions. In general, the 
working class became tied up with the Social Democratic Party or the Com-
munist Party through the medium of organization power of trade unions, ap-
plying the brake to the swelling of "reservior of latent right-wing radical 
electorate"64', and as a result the Nazis could only penetrate into the electorate 
of bourgeois parties. 
However, in the case of the industrial structure in which middle and small 
business was dominant, trade unions had less organization rate. Lacking an 
opportunity to unite labourers into trade unions, and without binding like 
obedience to Catholic churches, the radicalized working class shocked by the 
crisis became to be supporters of the Nazis65'. 
In contrast to heavy industrial district of Ruhr where the Communist Party 
penetrated powerfully because of radicalization of labourers amid the World 
Economic Crisis, the same radicalization of labourers resulted in distinct advance-
ment of the Nazis in textile industrial district of Chemnitz-Zwickau. 
In this way, although the Nazis were checked by the counter force such as 
organization power of trade unions and obedience to Catholic Churches, they 
penetrated into the urban and rural districts where the "middle" class was domi-
nant. The major social basis of Nazism was formed there. 
64) Ibid., S. 48. 
65) This point will be apparently certified in other districts in general. To take an exw 
ample, such a tendency is found out in Solingen and Remscheid of electoral district of 
DUsseldorfwEast and Iserlohn and Siegen of electoral district of Westphalia-South, cities 
of iron industry, where middle and small business was dominant. 
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IV 
As stated above it has been demonstrated with relatively concrete facts that 
major resonance boards with the rise of the Nazism were formed in the urban 
and rural districts, where Protestants was dominant and jet the middle class 
was dominant, under Weimar Republic which fell into a critical situation having 
impact of "Great Depression" from 1929 Crisis. However, an inquiry has to 
be made into the grounds why such the social basis of Nazism was fermented. 
In other words, not only a question, "Who elected Hitler?" but also "Why did 
they elect Hitler?" have to be solved, and after solving these questions the 
question, "Why was a Nazi triumphal parade possible in a country having Kant 
and Goethe?" or "How was Auschwitz made possible ?"66) can be answered. 
For this purpose, all the facts have to be analyzed above all the way how the 
middle class was involved in the rapid stream of social class differentiation, and 
the actual situation in which they were oppressed psychologically and economi-
cally on the one hand, and on the other, further analysis will be needed on. a 
series of policies including a review of economic policies of Weimar Republic 
which could not develop effective policies for the middle class and policies to 
deal with the crisis, a review of political lines of the Social Democratic Party 
and the Communist Party which failed in grasping the economically and psycho-
logically deteriorated middle class in which particularly the old middle class 
including the peasantry and the artisan class, and the studies on policies of the 
Nazis which succeeded to gain support of the broad middle class based on Nazi 
ruralism as claimed by Herbert Backe, "The Third Reich will be a peasant 
Reich or it will be nothing at all"67>. This paper presents only a part of premise 
for reaching these tasks68). 
Kyoto 
May, 1969 
66) Ralf Dahrendorf. Gesselschaft und Domokratie in Deutschland, MOnchen 1965, S. 17. 
67) Frieda Wunderlich, The National Socialist Agrarian Program, in: Social Research, Vol. 
13, No. I, 1946, p. 34. 
68) Refer to a my paper compiled in "History of Economics", Collected Works of Econo· 
mics (Chikuma-Shobo), Vol. 3, ed. by Y. Uchida, E. Ohno, K. Sumiya, M. Itoh, S. 
Hirata, Tokyo 1970. 
